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INTRODUCTION 
In Takings and Distributive Justice,1 I proposed a progressive in­
terpretation of the Compensation Clause. In his response, published in 
this issue,2 Professor Lunney challenges the plausibility and the desir­
ability of my interpretation and proposes an alternative. This Essay 
compares our approaches. It concludes that Professor Lunney's care­
ful examination of the public choice analysis of takings does refine my 
theory. Contrary to Professor Lunney's claims, however, these refine­
ments reinforce - rather than undermine - the viability of a progres­
sive takings doctrine. 
Parts I and II set the stage by summarizing the principal claims 
made, respectively, in my original Article and in Professor Lunney's 
response. Parts III and IV constitute the core of this Essay, vindicating 
both the plausibility and the normative desirability of my proposed 
doctrine. Part V provides two examples. A brief conclusion follows. 
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan; Senior Lecturer in Law and Juris­
prudence, Tel-Aviv University. LL.B. 1988, Tel-Aviv; LL.M. 1991, J.S.D. 1993, Yale. - Ed. 
My thanks go to Sharon Hannes, Rick Hills, Rick Pildes, and Omri Yadlin for helpful com­
ments and suggestions, to Sarah Rathke for research assistance, and to the Cegla Institute 
for Comparative and Public International Law for financial support. 
1. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999). 
2. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Takings, Efficiency, and Distributive Justice: A Response to Pro­
fessor Dagan, 99 MICH. L. REV. 401 (2000). 
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I. A PROGRESSIVE TAKINGS LAW 
In Takings and Distributive Justice, I claimed that takings law can 
accommodate the ideals of social responsibility and equality, and ar­
gued against the conventional wisdom that a relaxed regulatory tak­
ings doctrine - one that seeks to minimize the occasions of compen­
sating owners due to governmental regulation of their assets -
promotes these ideals. 3 By reconceptualizing two familiar tests in tak­
ings jurisprudence - reciprocity of advantage and diminution of value 
- I proposed a more refined test for distinguishing a taking from a 
regulation with a view to both civic virtues and egalitarian concerns. 
Finally, I suggested that, rather than radically transforming the current 
law, my theory provides a doctrinal vocabulary and normative under­
pinnings for understanding a significant segment of the already-extant 
takings jurisprudence. 
The premise of a progressive approach to takings law is that own­
ership is not merely a bundle of rights, but also a social institution that 
creates bonds of commitment and responsibility among owners and 
others affected by the owners' properties. Furthermore, property is an 
expression of a cluster of values - primarily privacy, security, and in­
dependence - each of which necessarily entails the distribution as 
well as the retention of wealth. Property necessarily entails distribu­
tion since ownership is a source of economic and, therefore, social, 
political, and cultural rights and powers, the correlatives of which are 
other people's duties and liabilities. 4 
Takings and Distributive Justice maintained that a progressive 
takings doctrine, committed to social responsibility and egalitarian 
concerns, must not - contrary to some conventional wisdom - be 
too oblivious to the imposition of disproportionate burdens in the pur­
suit of public actions. A relaxed takings doctrine, which calls for com­
pensation only in extreme cases, would tend to yield a systematic ex­
ploitation of small and relatively less well-off owners, who are ill­
equipped to protect themselves. 
Rejecting a relaxed takings doctrine of minimal compensation, 
however, does not mean that progressives, being committed to social 
3. For the conventional wisdom see, for example, C. Erwin Baker, Property and Its Re­
lation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 764-65 (1986) (arguing 
that protection against exploitation may not be best guide for property jurisprudence be­
cause ban on unjust individual exploitation would necessarily be so broad that it would also 
prevent desirable government actions); Frank.Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and 
Restitution for the Lost Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 69 
(1997) (arguing that most regulatory restrictions of land use should be perceived as ordinary 
examples of background risks and opportunities against which we take our chances as own­
ers of property). 
4. For a recent account of the progressive conception of ownership published after 
Takings and Distributive Justice, see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: 
LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF PROPERTY (2000). 
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responsibility and equality, must subscribe to a libertarian regime that 
would require full compensation in every case. Libertarians would re­
quire full compensation every time a taking's impact on one owner is 
disproportionate to the burden carried by other beneficiaries of that 
public use. 5 But progressives must reject a regime of full compensation 
in every case because such a regime would bar any redistribution of 
society's aggregate resources, wealth, and legal advantages.6 In addi­
tion, progressives should be apprehensive about the libertarian strict 
proportionality rule because it implies that our mutual obligations as 
citizens are derived solely from either consent or self-advantage. Thus, 
the strict proportionality regime underplays the significance of be­
longing, membership, and citizenship, and it therefore undermines so­
cial responsibility. 
A takings doctrine attuned to the virtues of social responsibility 
and equality must therefore avoid both of these extreme positions of 
uniform no compensation and uniform full compensation. Instead, it 
should start with a rule of long-term reciprocity of advantage: A public 
action imposing a disproportionate burden is not a taking as long as 
the immediate burden on the claimant is not extreme, and the claim­
ant stands to enjoy benefits of similar magnitude from other public ac­
tions, even if those benefits are not contemporaneous. This conception 
of reciprocity of advantage attempts to recognize, preserve, and foster 
the significance of membership and citizenship. At the same time, this 
approach still cautiously avoids being too utopian about citizenship by 
acknowledging the detrimental consequences that a no-compensation 
regime would have in our non-ideal world and, thus, requiring long­
term rough equivalence of burdens and advantages.7 
A further refinement is necessary. An egalitarian takings doctrine 
must be cautious lest it consistently require disproportionate contribu­
tions to the community's well-being from owners who are either po­
litically weak or economically disadvantaged. A government's claim 
that a citizen should bear a disproportionate burden of a public action 
based on the citizen's responsibility toward her fellow citizens is not 
5. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 4, 205, 207 (1985). 
6. Professor Lunney suggests that wealth distribution need not rely on takings doctrine, 
but can instead be accomplished through progressive taxation. Lunney, supra note 2, at 424. 
I have addressed this view in my original article in some detail, and have found it unpersua­
sive. Dagan, supra note 1, at 785-92. For a recent critique of the view that distributive goals 
are best accomplished through the tax code, see Chris W. Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal 
Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000). 
7. I also noted that localism can be an important component of long-term reciprocity of 
advantage: "[The] conception of long-term reciprocity requires some distinction between 
public actions that benefit localities and public actions of larger governmental bodies. In the 
former category - where the beneficiary of the burden is one's local community - toler­
ance toward deviations from proportionality is especially warranted." Dagan, supra note 1, 
at 776. 
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credible if it systematically targets the weaker sectors of society. This 
concern is especially warranted when the direct beneficiaries of a gov­
ernment action enjoy significant political or economic power. The 
egalitarian prong of my proposed takings doctrine addresses these 
concerns. Where the claimant is weak or disadvantaged, I propose to 
replace the standard of rough reciprocity of advantage with the more 
stringent standard of strict proportionality, which then better serves 
the goals of a progressive takings doctrine. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the socioeconomic status of the 
claimant should be considered overtly only in extreme cases. In most 
cases, the egalitarian requirement of a progressive takings regime 
should be satisfied using a proxy based on the diminution of value 
test:8 If the diminution of value inflicted by the public action is meas­
ured against the value of the claimant's affected land as a whole (or 
her total holdings in the same locality), and the applicable threshold is 
not set at the extreme positions of either total deprivation or de mini­
mis reductions, this test yields a built-in disincentive against imposing 
the public burden on small, politically weak landowners.9 
Takings and Distributive Justice demonstrated (perhaps surpris­
ingly) that considerations of efficiency also support a progressive tak­
ings regime. 10 A progressive takings law is efficient, I maintained, since 
8. My colleague, Professor Roderick Hills, disagrees. He claims that, as a matter of fact, 
small landowners tend to be politically influential. In contrast, big landowners - developers 
- in mid-sized American municipalities tend to be politically weak, because their "constitu­
ents" are non-resident home-buyers who do not vote in municipal elections. Thus, Professor 
Hills believes that existing takings doctrine gives too much, rather than too little, protection 
to individual lot owners - overwhelmingly homeowners, whose politics tend to be NIMBY 
(not in my back yard) politics. By the same token, current doctrine, in his view, does not give 
enough protection to big developers who usually represent high-density housing, and there­
fore low-income households. 
If these claims are correct, then my proposed doctrine is seriously misguided, as it 
strengthens the strong and weakens the weak, contrary to its own normative prescriptions. 
In other words, under these empirical assumptions, the way to implement my call to use 
takings law to counterbalance disproportional advantages of political influence is through a 
very different doctrinal test, one that alters the law to protect developers more, because they 
are the practical proxies for such home-buyers. Cf Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Home­
owners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982) (landowners should have voting power 
in municipal elections proportionate to their acreage, in order to allow developers to repre­
sent their buyers by proxy more equally and effectively). 
9. Indeed, Takings and Distributive Justice was consciously modest regarding the role 
that substantive equality can play in takings doctrine. It openly acknowledged "the de­
manding limitations that planning places on th.e possibility of promoting social justice 
through Lludge-made) land use law." Dagan, supra note 1, at 779. Accordingly, it focused 
merely on the attempt to avoid any preferential treatment of the better off. At times, Profes­
sor Lunney's response ignores this subtlety. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 2, at 417, n.34 and 
accompanying text. 
10. I also maintained that considerations of personality support my progressive test and 
that it does not unduly hinder the liberty concerns of the better-off. Dagan, supra note 1, at 
790. Since Professor Lunney's response focuses on efficiency, I also ignore these other con­
siderations. Professor Lunney also briefly refers to a concern of "horizontal equity." Lunney, 
supra note 2, at 413. I have responded to this concern in some detail in my original article 
and have found it unpersuasive. Dagan, supra note 1, at 788-89. 
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it provides proper incentives to both private landowners and public of­
ficials. Because Professor Lunney's critique does not address my ar­
guments about private landowners,11 I will confine my discussion to 
public officials. 
Assuming that democratic mechanisms make public officials ac­
countable for budget management, compensation is important to cre­
ate a budgetary effect that forces governments to internalize the costs 
that their decisions impose on private resource holders. Without a 
compensation requirement, public officials might suffer from a "fiscal 
illusion" as to the true social cost of government action. The need to 
overcome public officials' "fiscal illusion" applies especially when the 
injured parties are part of the nonorganized public - where they are 
"occasional individuals," or where they are members of a marginal 
group with little political influence. In these cases, in which the risk 
that public officials will dismiss private costs is acute, compensation 
may be the only feasible counterbalance. In contrast, in cases in which 
the public action imposes costs on members of powerful and organized 
groups, the landowners will probably be able to protect themselves 
politically, even in the absence of required compensation. Even if a 
powerful landowner suffers a loss due to the public use, the political 
system offsets this loss (in many cases) by a quid pro quo elsewhere, 
either with regard to planning issues or in other matters. 
Thus, a uniform nonprogressive compensation regime distorts the 
incentives of public officials by systematically encouraging them to 
impose the burden on members of the nonorganized public or on mar­
ginal groups, even where the best choice, from a planning perspective, 
would place the burden on members of powerful or organized groups. 
Only a progressive compensation scheme equalizes the pressures that 
the public authority faces when selecting the land that will bear a pub­
lic project, and only a progressive compensation scheme induces the 
public authority to focus solely on planning considerations. 
11. For private landowners, progressive compensation appropriately mediates between 
two conflicting investment considerations. Compensation is said to be required to prevent 
underinvestment by risk-averse landowners in their property. However, if the law guaran­
tees the full value of landowners' investments whenever they could have foreseen the pros­
pect of a loss in value as the result of a public use, landowners may inefficiently overinvest. 
Due to the diminishing marginal utility of income, the concern of inefficient underinvest­
ment by landowners is heightened (and compensation consequently gains in importance) to 
the extent that the taking affects a more substantial segment of the injured party's estate (all 
other things being equal). A progressive compensation regime approximates a proper bal­
ance since it offsets this increased risk of underinvestment by increasing compensation. 
Thus, a private homeowner, who is not a professional investor and who has purchased a 
small parcel of land with her life savings, may be a typical example where full compensation 
should be required. In contrast, wealthier individuals - and even more so, broadly-held 
corporations - who own land as part of diversified investment portfolios - are less risk­
averse. Facing a possibility of an uncompensated investment, they are likely to efficiently 
adjust their investment decisions commensurate with the risk that their land will be put to 
public use. For extremely wealthy landowners, the concern of under-investment may not 
mandate full (or even any) compensation. 
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II. PROFESSOR LUNNEY'S CRITICISMS 
Professor Lunney's response discusses only the egalitarian prong 
of my theory, but he does not address how the diminution of value test 
(as a proxy for egalitarian concerns) implements this component. 
Rather, Professor Lunney criticizes my idea of "compensat[ing] more 
readily or at a higher level the less wealthy property owners." 12 His cri­
tique is twofold. First, he claims that "inject[ing] an express distribu­
tive justice component into the compensation analysis . . . will not 
work," 13 namely, that such a scheme will not effectively neutralize the 
lobbying pressure of politically powerful contingents. Second, he 
maintains that even if my scheme does work, "achieving a balance in 
such a way would prove undesirable. " 14 
Professor Lunney discounts the notion that a progressive takings 
law would generate an effective counterbalance to the lobbying pres­
sure of powerful groups as "implausible." 15 He analyzes two types of 
cases and anticipates results opposite to those predicted by my the­
ory . 16 First, Professor Lunney discusses cases in which "the govern­
ment must choose between acting, and thereby imposing a cost on a 
powerful interest group, and not acting at all." 17 Regarding these "act 
or abstain" planning decisions, Professor Lunney is not persuaded by 
my claim that "we need not compensate politically powerful interest 
groups as readily because their political power will enable them to ex­
tract compensation through the give-and-take of the legislative proc­
ess." 18 The political power to block a specific measure, he maintains, 
may not be convertible to political power elsewhere. Professor Lunney 
reminds us that political power "is usually contextual and therefore 
inherently dependent on the position one is taking." 19 Therefore, a 
"principled opposition" to a proposed government action on the mer­
its is more effective than "attempted extortion" of compensation.20 If 
successful, principled opposition would reveal that the proposed ac­
tion was "undesirable," and would therefore leave no room for any 
12. Lunney, supra note 2,_at 406. 
13. Id. at 402. 
14. Id. at 407. 
15. Id. at 409. 
16. For methodological reasons, I start my discussion with "act or abstain" planning de­
cisions and only afterwards turn my attention to placement planning decisions. Professor 
Lunney discusses these cases in the opposite order. Nothing but the flow of my argument 
turns on this reordering. 
17. Lunney, supra note 2, at 417-18. 
18. Id. at 418. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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further "log-rolling bargain." 21 Only "[a]n up-front promise of com­
pensation . . . can substantially overcome this public choice prob­
lem. " 22 
Professor Lunney reaches a similar conclusion regarding cases in 
which there is a choice between imposing the burden on a relatively 
powerful and a relatively powerless property-owning group. His claim 
regarding these cases of placement planning decisions is twofold. As 
the relative compensation to powerful contingents decreases, he 
claims, their opposition to the costs of public planning decisions im­
posed on them "would likely grow stronger and even more strident. "23 
By the same token, "as you pay more to the [powerless] landowners, 
their opposition . . .  would be reduced. "24 Given these consequences, 
public planning burdens are more likely to be borne by the less power­
ful, regardless of efficient planning considerations, thereby increasing 
the likelihood that the planning authority's decision will be regressive 
and inefficient. Professor Lunney also maintains that we cannot count 
on "[t]axpayers and other groups competing for government fund­
ing" 25 to oppose the higher cost of planning decisions since "[t]hese 
budget-concerned groups are . . .  only indirectly affected by the higher 
[project] cost that progressive compensation may generate" and are 
thus unlikely to be an effective counterbalance. 26 At best, trying to 
force effectively unbiased placing decisions through progressive com­
pensation would result in governmental inaction. The regressive (and 
inefficient) placement will no longer be affordable; the progressive 
(and efficient) one "would not be politically viable." 27 
Even if my progressive takings doctrine works as I expect, how­
ever, Professor Lunney still would not endorse it for three main rea­
sons. First, the "simpler and more appropriate avenue" of increasing 
compensation to approximate the landowners' true losses should 
"tend to quiet" political opposition to placement decisions and 
thereby achieve my goal. 28 Thus, uniform full compensation encour­
ages planning authorities "to adopt the efficient, rather than the politi­
cally-expedient, solution." 29 Funding compensation through progres­
sive taxation is how Professor Lunney would further the proper 
distributive goals. Second, a progressive compensation scheme would 
21. Id. at 419. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 409. 
24. Id. at 410-11. 
25. Id. at 410. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 411. 
28. Id. at 412. 
29. Id. 
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require courts either to second-guess what constitutes socially optimal 
planning decisions or to separate legitimate from illegitimate uses of 
political power on the part of affluent powerful groups and "award 
progressive compensation in those cases in which it appeared that the 
illegitimate political power was driving" the project placement deci­
sion. 30 These determinations - as well as the concept of distributive 
justice itself - are "the least susceptible to judicial resolution. " 3 1  Thus, 
Professor Lunney invokes "Lochner's shadow" to warn against the in­
stitutional difficulties my theory raises. Finally, while Professor 
Lunney does not dispute the value of social responsibility and civic vir­
tue, he insists that "these, like all virtues, come from within and cannot 
be forced by legal rules." 3 2  A progressive takings regime may force 
property owners "to give up their property ... for the sake of the com­
munity," but it can never make them "more virtuous or more respon­
sible." 3 3  
Professor Lunney also presents an alternative to progressive tak­
ings.34 His interpretation of the Compensation Clause focuses on 
"whether the government has acted in a manner to deprive the very 
few of a property interest for the sake of the very many." 3 5  Requiring 
compensation in such instances would "eliminate the few's opposition 
to the measure and thereby improve the legislature's ability both to 
evaluate the proposed action's merits and to go forward should action 
prove desirable." 3 6  Thus, "a uniform few-many test, together with 
something closer to 'true loss' compensation awards, would achieve 
the same distributive justice goals if funded through progressive taxa­
tion" and it "would prove better able to overcome the efficiency con­
cerns associated with takings." 3 7  
Ill. THE INCENTIVES OF PROGRESSIVE COMPENSATION 
A. Public Choice and Public Reason 
The crux of Professor Lunney's complaint about my progressive 
takings doctrine lies in his analysis of the incentive effects of our com­
peting regimes on the behavior of public officials. If I read him cor-
30. Id. at 414. 
31. Id. at 416. 
32. Id. at 425. 
33. Id. 
34. Professor Lunney has presented this alternative earlier: Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A 
Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892 (1992). I have 
criticized his scheme in Dagan, supra note 1, at 753-54. 
35. Lunney, supra note 2, at 420. 
36. Id. at 402. 
37. Id. at 424. 
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reedy, Professor Lunney has no normative quarrel with social respon­
sibility and equality (although he believes that social responsibility 
cannot be promoted by law). Moreover, we both agree that a proper 
regime should neutralize, as much as possible, any biased (non­
planning) considerations from the planning authority's decision. We 
differ, however, as to which regime would do the job. 
In discussing this question, I want to use Professor Lunney's help­
ful refinement of traditional public choice analysis. Most such analyses 
(including mine, in my original article) conceptualize interest groups' 
influence only in terms of their wealth, power, and comparative ad­
vantage in acting collectively (the "collective action comparative ad­
vantage"). Professor Lunney resists this reductionist strategy. He in­
sists that political power is contextual and, more importantly, 
dependent upon one's position and one's arguments - that the plau­
sibility, and even persuasiveness, of an interest group's lobbying ef­
forts must be taken into account in considering its ultimate influence.3 8  
Professor Lunney's refinement on this front seems to me persua­
sive. Injecting normativity into the public choice analysis is important 
and valuable. It (implicitly) helps mediate between two accounts of 
government action. 3 9  One account understands the government to act 
as a buffer between conflicting interests and to aggregate their respec­
tive pressures. Another, much more sanguine, account sees the gov­
ernment as a loyal servant of the public interest. Each of these ac­
counts has been the subject of some criticism. The former account -
public choice theory - is said to undervalue the constraints that pub­
lic reason imposes on legislative (or administrative) action; thus, it is 
accused for being positively inaccurate and normatively nihilist. 4 0  The 
latter account - public interest theory - is criticized for disregarding 
the influence of parochial interest groups; thus, it is portrayed as ro­
mantic, naive, and frequently - given our non-ideal world in which 
such influence is prevalent - counterproductive. 4 1  As I understand it, 
Professor Lunney's framework transcends this divide. It acknowledges 
the reality of influences based on wealth, power, and collective action 
38. Traditional public choice analysis may present this point as the need to consider the 
relative abilities of interest groups to mobilize votes. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE 
STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 114 (2000). While this point is indeed familiar, I think that the 
way Professor Lunney recasts it is valuable. As the text below explains, Professor Lunney's 
formulation focuses the inquiry on the normative power of an interest group's reasons. Thus, 
the reformulation (implicitly) highlights the importance of the prevalent social meanings 
that ultimately determine this normative power. 
39. On these two accounts of government action, see, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, 
CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PuBLIC LAW 15-21, 32-40 
(1997); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. l, 34-41, 65-70, 76-81 (1998). 
40. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 39, at 25-27; Croley, supra note 39, at 41-56. 
41. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 39, at 27-29; Croley, supra note 39, at 70-76, 81-86. 
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comparative advantage. It still insists, however, that reasons have their 
own weight. 4 2  Thus, both public choice and public interest are ac­
knowledged. 
I happily endorse this account, which ignores neither material in­
centives nor social meanings. I believe, however, that my takings the­
ory, building on incentives and social meanings, is improved rather 
than challenged by using this richer understanding of government. 
B. "Act or Abstain" Planning Decisions 
I believe that the specific conclusion Professor Lunney draws from 
this framework to the takings context is misguided. Professor Lunney 
believes that, given the importance of reasons, an interest group's ef­
forts to resist an undesirable public measure must be understood in 
the binary terms of success (blocking the measure) or failure. There­
fore, in his view, there is (almost) no possibility of translating that 
group's political influence into any type of compensation because the 
group's justifications for blocking the measure are inapplicable to any 
other context. Thus, only a legal entitlement to full compensation can 
help neutralize the potentially distorting pressure of strong interest 
groups. 
This conclusion is premised on the view that once an objection to a 
project is formulated as a commodified claim for a quid pro quo, it 
loses all value. This view, however, is implausible for two reasons. 
First, in order for Professor Lunney's conclusion to be correct, the 
persuasiveness of an interest group's reasons should solely determine 
its influence. But if there is any truth in the public choice insight of the 
impact of power, wealth, and collective action comparative advantage, 
this must be wrong. Even if a shift from an effort to block a measure 
to an attempt to extract compensation elsewhere detracts from the 
persuasive power of lobbyists' claims, their material influence does not 
simply evaporate. Second, even if we focus solely on the normative 
power of the interest group's opposition, it is not clear that such a shift 
would indeed have the devastating consequences Professor Lunney 
anticipates. He portrays the choice between blocking an action and 
requiring compensation as a choice between a (benign) "principled 
opposition" on the merits and an "attempted extortion" (necessarily 
invidious) of a quid pro quo.43 But this characterization assumes what 
must be proven. While I appreciate the a priori advantage of an argu­
ment that presents a project as socially undesirable, this is by no 
means the only type of argument with normative power. In particular, 
an argument based on distributive distortion - a complaint of majori-
42. Cf Don Herzog, Externalities and Other Parasites, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 895 (2000) 
(reasons underlie preferences). 
43. Lunney, supra note 2, at 418. 
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tarian exploitation - can be just as principled as one targeting the de­
sirability of the proposed government action. Therefore, there is no 
reason to believe that such an argument would not gain, if perceived 
to be correct, at least as much sympathy and normative power. 4 4  
Because a complaint against the distribution of a project's costs 
can be just as normatively powerful as a complaint against the proj­
ect's social desirability, and because the non-normative bases of the 
power of interest groups are, in any event, also significant, it is reason­
able to conclude - contrary to Professor Lunney's objection - that 
power asserted (albeit unsuccessfully) to block a public measure can 
be translated into power to extract in-kind compensation if the pro­
posed project does go forward. 4 5  Hence, Professor Lunney is wrong in 
claiming that only a legal entitlement to compensation can overcome 
interest group objections where the government's choice is imposing 
the cost on such a group or not acting at all. 4 6  
C. Placement Planning Decisions 
Consider now the other type of case, in which the planning 
authority faces a choice of placement respecting a given public action. 
Professor Lunney believes that a progressive takings law tends to pro­
duce either regressive placement decisions or government inaction. 
But again his analysis is flawed. 
Professor Lunney's first argument on this point is that, as the rela­
tive compensation to powerful contingents decreases, "their opposi­
tion . . . would likely grow stronger and even more strident."4 7 He 
seems to be aware that - compared to the current state of the law -
my theory would not decrease the absolute level of compensation 
44. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, BO HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1216-17 (1967) (the key 
to demoralization - a pivotal concern in the utilitarian analysis of just compensation law -
lies in the "risk of majoritarian exploitation"). 
45. Cf Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation 
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 376 n.89 (2000) ("Lunney fails to recognize 
that insofar as compensation is a useful way for legislatures to co-opt concentrated interest 
groups opposed to takings, they will pay compensation voluntarily."). 
46. The main example Professor Lunney uses for the "act or abstain" planning decision 
scenario is Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). I discussed Penn Central at 
some length in my original article. Dagan, supra note l, at 795-99. Following this discussion, 
Professor Lunney admits that Penn Central shows that progressive compensation does not 
invariably lead to a defeat of desirable projects. But he still resists progressive compensation 
because, in his view, progressive compensation generates heightened opposition costs of 
powerful claimants that are socially undesirable even when their lobbying efforts are ulti­
mately unsuccessful. However, the claim that progressive compensation generates excessive 
opposition costs - a claim central to Professor Lunney's discussion of the placement plan­
ning decision cases, to which I now turn - is untenable. See infra text accompanying notes 
47-49. 
47. Lunney, supra note 2, at 409. 
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granted to affluent landowners, but rather (indirectly, via the proxy of 
diminution of value) increase the average level of compensation to 
powerless landowners. Nonetheless, he maintains that 
progressive compensation would still generate more strenuous opposi­
tion by the [affluent] contingent ... [as they] would still have more to 
complain about because they would not be receiving as much as the 
[weaker] landowners would have. The perception of unfairness gener­
ated by the unequal compensation levels would lead the [affluent] con­
tingent to demand "equal" (and hence fair) compensation.48 
This statement seems to follow our shared premise regarding the im­
pact of the justificatory power of reasons on an interest group's power. 
It assumes that a progressive takings law is unfair and thus concludes 
that the influence of an affluent contingency opposing a measure un­
der such a regime would be stronger than its influence under current 
rules. 
Professor Lunney's assumption, however, begs the question. I cer­
tainly agree that, other things being equal, opposition to a patently un­
fair measure is frequently more powerful than opposition to a fair 
measure. But a progressive takings regime is not patently unfair. On 
the contrary, this regime vindicates - better than Professor Lunney's 
uniform few-many test (as Part IV shows) - the values of social re­
sponsibility and equality. Hence, insofar as social responsibility and 
equality are - or will become - respectable public reasons under a 
progressive compensation regime, there is no reason to believe that a 
legal regime that relies on these values would be especially vulnerable 
to interest group fairness challenges. 
Professor Lunney's second argument in support of the claim that a 
progressive takings law would generate regressive placement decisions 
is that such a regime would reduce the opposition of weaker landown­
ers to placement decisions that hurt them. It may be true that the 
prospect of greater compensation would somewhat increase compla­
cency among such groups, but this impact is likely to be rather mini­
mal. As Professor Lunney himself admits, compensation under current 
law is far from being complete. 4 9  (It notably does not cover subjective 
losses. 5 0) Thus, even when "just compensation" is granted, a claimant 
48. Id. at 409 n.20. 
49. Id. at 406. Nevertheless, Professor Lunney "defines" just compensation as that level 
of compensation that makes landowners indifferent. Id. at 412 n.26. 
50. Good economic reasons exist for the law's choice not to cover subjective (nonpecu­
niary) losses. Recall that compensation is a kind of insurance, for which all citizens pay (by a 
tax increase). Conventional economic wisdom says that people are generally not interested 
in purchasing insurance for nonpecuniary losses because the extra money they will get can­
not, by definition, restore the irreplaceable good that they lost. Thus, taxpayers do not value 
the compensation for the nonpecuniary fraction of their losses in cases of takings more than 
the money lost in the tax increase. (Notice, however, that although potential takings victims 
do not want insurance-compensation ex ante, they will still - as the text below claims -
want increased compensation ex post in order to minimize their nonpecuniary losses.) See, 
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can hardly be expected to remain indifferent between compensation 
and the loss inflicted by the public action at issue. Professor Lunney is 
aware of this difficulty and therefore advocates "something closer to 
'true loss' compensation awards."5 1 This response, however, is inade­
quate. The problem is not only with certain doctrinal faults that can be 
easily reformed. Rather, undercompensation is inherent in the takings 
scenario: "Both transaction costs and subjective preferences may lead 
landowners to prefer the status quo - which .includes the possibility of 
voluntary realization - to the forced transfer of their proprietary 
rights against the fair market value thereof,"5 2 however calculated. 
Therefore, no technical reform of the just compensation formula is 
likely to satisfy disgruntled landowners sufficiently that they lose in­
terest in lobbying to shift the impact of a public project to other peo­
ple's land. 
Finally, Professor Lunney maintains that if we tried to force the 
proper placement of the public project through progressive compensa­
tion, the likely result would be governmental inaction because budget­
ary constraints would make placement on the land of weaker owners 
impossible, while political concerns would preclude building the proj­
ect on the land of the more powerful landowners.5 3  This conclusion is 
untenable: First, as I indicated above, progressive compensation would 
not make powerful landowners' resistance to disadvantageous siting 
decisions much more zealous and vociferous. Furthermore, Professor 
Lunney's conclusion discounts (or ignores) the fact that invariably, in 
such situations, some additional pressure will come from the commu­
nity that needs the project at hand.5 4 The community will also be able 
to marshal normatively powerful arguments in favor of the planning 
decision. Finally, because the compensation accorded to the less afflu­
ent is never higher than the diminution of the fair market value of 
their land, there is no basis for Professor Lunney's claim that progres-
e.g., STEVEN SHA YELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 228-31 (1987); Patricia M. 
Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 517, 521 (1984). But see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs 
of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1914-16 
(1995) (advocating nonpecuniary damages on basis of consumer demand). 
51. Lunney, supra note 2, at 424. 
52. Dagan, supra note 1, at 755. 
53. Lunney, supra note 2, at 418-19. 
54. This argument depends on the assumption that the community that needs the proj­
ect can organize to support it. The extent or intensity of this additional pressure will obvi­
ously vary, depending in part on the ability of the benefited group to organize to support the 
project. Despite potential collective action problems, however, it would not be unreasonable 
to assume that this additional pressure would be considerable if the proposed project were 
indeed socially beneficial. 
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sive compensation will make project sitings on the land of the less af­
fluent prohibitively expensive.ss 
* * * 
In contrast to Professor Lunney's arguments, progressive compen­
sation would not increase the effective opposition of strong interest 
groups, and it would not significantly decrease the opposition of 
weaker landowners. It will work - as intended - as a legal pressure 
that increases the cost of placing a project in a way that harms the 
powerless. Contrary to Professor Lunney's claim, the higher price tag 
on taking less affluent properties does not "introduce an artificial 
bias" that may distort unbiased siting decisions.5 6  Rather, this mecha­
nism works to counterbalance an already-extant bias in the system -
the heightened political power of affluent groups - so that planning 
considerations can once again become the focus of the siting decision. 
It is, admittedly, difficult to figure out how much legal pressure is 
required neatly and exactly to neutralize the non-planning lobbying 
pressures of such strong interest groups. Nonetheless, it is important 
to realize that the absence of countervailing legal pressure does not 
generate the "efficient, rather than the politically expedient, solution," 
as Professor Lunney implies.5 7 Rather, any nonprogressive regime, in­
cluding Professor Lunney's proposed few-many· rule, generates place­
ment decisions that are biased in favor of strong landowners and are 
55. The main example Professor Lunney uses to show the inferiority of my progressive 
compensation proposal in the placement planning decisions scenario is the Watts Freeway 
Project. He claims that the unfortunate placement of the freeway resulted from the fact that 
Just Compensation law does not fully compensate, so the more affluent landowners' opposi­
tion simply drowned out the poorer landowners' objections due to their heightened political, 
economic, and social power. Lunney, supra note 2, at 404-06. However, the Watts Freeway 
case may actually illustrate that a uniform full compensation rule will invariably push the 
burdens of planning decisions on the less well-off simply because the price tag will always be 
lower. Pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Poli­
cies Act §§ 4601 et seq., whenever a government project displaces a property owner, the head 
of the displacing agency must reimburse the displaced owner for the actual and reasonable 
moving expenses and loss of personal property. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4622. In cases of residen­
tial displacement, the government must also pay the reasonable cost of replacement dwelling 
in cases where reimbursement alone is insufficient to cover this expense, any debt service 
costs required to finance replacement housing, and any reasonable expenses incurred for 
evidence of title, recording fees, and any other costs incident to the replacement housing 
purchase. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4623(a). Subject to the inherent, unresolvable difficulties of any 
compensation scheme, discussed supra note 52 and accompanying text, this formula very 
nearly approximates "full compensation." And, following precisely the predictions of my 
theory, at least one of the reasons cited by the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment 
Agency for their decision to run the highway through Watts and Compton rather than 
nearer to downtown in the Beverly Hills area was that relocation in the former area was es­
timated to cost only $50,000 per unit, while relocation in the more expensive areas was esti­
mated to cost almost twice that. See William Trombley & Ray Hebert, Bold Housing Pro­
gram Develops Big Problems, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1987, at 1. 
56. Lunney, supra note 2, at 415. 
57. Id. at 412. 
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thus systematically both regressive and (from a purely planning view­
point) sub-optimal. Only a progressive compensation scheme im­
proves on - although imprecisely and probably still imperfectly58 -
these undesirable outcomes.59 
IV. THE SOCIAL MEANING OF PROGRESSIVE COMPENSATION 
In the conclusion of his response, Professor Lunney raises doubts 
as to the propriety of my attempt to promote social responsibility and 
civic virtue through law. Desirable they are, he admits, but he still 
claims that "these, like all virtues, come from within and cannot be 
forced by legal rules." 60 A progressive takings law may generate desir­
able material results, "[b]ut we should not make the mistake of think­
ing that we have thereby made [the affected] landowners more virtu­
ous or more responsible. We have simply set the stage for them to 
make absolutely certain that someone else will have the pleasure of 
experiencing 'civic virtue' the next time." 6 1  
This response fails to appreciate the expressive role of rights - in 
our context, the right to property - in constitutional adjudication. It 
further undervalues the intricate ways in which legal discourse affects 
social meanings. Finally, it paradoxically undermines the importance 
of Professor Lunney's own insight regarding the interaction between 
power and reasons in the way interest groups influence outcomes. 
In characterizing the expressive role of rights, Professor Pildes re­
cently explained that "[r]ights are not general trumps against appeals 
to the common good," 6 2  as they are sometimes mistakenly conceptu­
alized. Rather, in actual constitutional practice, rights "serve as tech­
nical means for bringing into court these issues involving the constitu­
tional conception of various common goods." 6 3  Properly understood, 
58. Indeed, in some cases, as Professor Lunney claims, increased relative compensation 
to less well-off property owners may push the cost of imposing the planning decision on the 
less well-off higher than the cost of imposing it on the wealthy, even when choosing the land 
of the less well-off owners is more efficient. Id. at 414 n.29. But there is no reason to believe 
that this effect will be particularly frequent. And there is certainly no reason to think that 
this imperfection outweighs the regressive distortions of a uniform compensation scheme. 
59. At one point, Professor Lunney almost concedes my claim that less compensation 
would ensure unbiased placement decisions. He admits that a reduced compensation scheme 
may be needed to compensate for disproportionately vocal lobbying groups. Id. at 412 n.27 
(relating to "the road contractors' pro-road influence"). This concession admits that in­
creased compensation to less affluent and powerful groups is appropriate to counterbalance 
the non-planning-related pressures that the affluent are able to bring to bear on planning 
decisions. 
60. Id. at 425. 
61. Id. 
62 Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, 
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 729 (1998). 
63. Id. at 744. 
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rights discourse is a means to "constrain the kind of reasons that gov­
ernment can act on when it seeks to regulate or intervene in some 
sphere of activity." 6 4  Rights discourse enables courts "to attend to the 
expressive dimensions of governmental action," policing its corre­
spondence to "collective interests and structural concerns." 6 5  
Takings and Distributive Justice fits within this expressive frame­
work. 6 6  This interpretation suggests that the Compensation Clause is 
devoted to realizing not only the common good of individual liberty 
but also other common goods: social responsibility and equality. In­
corporating this multitude of common goods into the meaning of the 
constitutional right to property redefines the scope of legitimate gov­
ernment intervention. I have already addressed in the previous Part 
the direct material consequences of this doctrine, but it is significant to 
appreciate its expressive dimension as well. A progressive takings law 
is a symbolic public expression of our bonds of concern and solidarity 
with others, a political reaffirmation of the importance that we attach 
to social responsibility and civic virtue. 6 7  
Moreover, this expressive dimension is likely to generate cultural 
consequences that may feed back into the direct material conse­
quences of the doctrine. The social meaning of the right to property -
the common goods we believe this right is meant to realize - defines 
the realm of normatively powerful objections to government action, as 
well as the realm of objections that we tend to perceive as merely self­
centered, and thus publicly inconsequential. More precisely, as I claim 
in the remainder of this Part, incorporating a progressive conception 
of property into takings law is likely to affect the normative power of 
the claims raised by the parties in a way that reinforces the outcomes 
intended by the progressive takings doctrine. 
It is important not to overstate the claim of the normative influ­
ence of takings law: I do not believe that the doctrinal details of tak­
ings law, or of any other branch of the law, for that matter, directly 
shape people's values and preferences - obviously not the prefer­
ences and values of those it immediately regulates. The possible cul­
tural consequences of takings law are more subtle in at least two 
senses. 
First, "what may affect people's preferences and values are not 
specific doctrinal rules (of which they are usually unaware), but rather, 
the more fundamental legal concepts and institutions. Thus, in our 
64. Id. at 731 (emphasis added). 
65. Id. at 761, 744. 
66. For an elaborate exposition and defense of this expressive framework, see Elizabeth 
S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000). 
67. Cf ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDIATIONS 288-92 
(1989). 
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case, I do not claim that the specific contours of the compensation re­
gime of takings law have any expressive function." 6 8  Rather, I claim 
that, given its prominence and popular visibility, "takings doctrine 
may have significant ramifications on our conception of ownership, 
and that ownership - a concept of popular use that is legally con­
structed - may affect people's preferences and values." 6 9  In other 
words, my proposed theory expresses a progressive approach to own­
ership that internalizes civic virtues and egalitarian concerns about dis­
tribution into the concept of property. And it is by vindicating this 
progressive understanding of ownership that a progressive takings law 
may help reshape our vision of our responsibilities as owners, our ex­
pectations of owners, and the limits of what we perceive to be the le­
gitimate interests of owners. 7 0  
Second, even the more fundamental legal concepts and institutions 
- in our case, ownership - do not directly affect the preferences and 
values of the people they regulate. Rather, because people's decisions 
are "based in part on their perception of the values, beliefs, and be­
havior of other individuals," doctrines that affect the social meaning of 
fundamental legal concepts and institutions - such as the rules that 
determine our understanding of ownership - exert social influences 
that eventually affect the regulated subjects. 7 1  
Even considering these two caveats, critics - such as Professor 
Lunney - may be alarmed by any reference to the value-shaping 
function of law. The concern is typically twofold. First, one should not 
"assume too readily that the government will exercise this [function] 
in a benign fashion." 7 2  Second, legal intervention "may weaken, rather 
than foster, an individual's capacity for moral choice" by converting 
moral action to one induced by "the individual's selfish desire to avoid 
law's sanction." 7 3  
68. Dagan, supra note 1, at 791 n.177. 
69. Id. 
70. For the crucial importance of re-negotiating the meaning of the concept of property 
given its "normative resilience," see Jeremy Waldron, The Normative Resilience of Property, 
in PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 170, 190-91, 195 (Janet McLean ed., 1999). See also, 
e.g., Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Private Property and Public Propriety, in PROPERTY 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 11, 15 (Janet McLean ed., 1999) ("[F]airly huge outcomes will turn 
on whether we attribute continued vitality to the unqualified exclusory function of 'property' 
or choose instead to fashion our property thinking to accord with more inclusive, more inte­
grative visions of social relationship."). 
71. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 349, 365 (1997); see also Hanoch Dagan, In Defense of the Good Samaritan, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 1152, 1172 (1999); Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Set/­
Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal The­
ory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1065 (1998). 
72. Lunney, supra note 2, at 424. 
73. Id. at 425. 
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A cautious attitude toward governmental action is always war­
ranted.7 4 But notice that the caution about law's stance towards fun­
damental moral choices does not apply merely with respect to legal 
regimes that attempt to promote other-regarding values. Rather, it 
applies, and with identical force, with regard to libertarian legal re­
gimes. As an important social institution, law cannot avoid affecting -
in the modest sense described above - popular consciousness.7 5 
Therefore, the question is not whether law should be in the business of 
affecting values, but rather which values law should promote.7 6  
To be sure, there are cases in which law's coerciveness indeed un­
dermines its normativity. Where the goals or the means of a legal 
norm are overly ambitious vis-a-vis people's preexisting preferences, 
they are perceived as unreasonable, maybe even offensive.77 In such 
cases, law is devoid of any normative impact. Its recipients, like 
Holmes' bad man, respond solely to its sanctions.78 
But the progressive takings doctrine I propose does not fall into 
this trap. It is consciously modest respecting the disproportionality of 
the burden imposed in the name of social responsibility. Moreover, it 
justifies the denial of compensation only if such burden is likely to be 
offset by benefits of similar magnitude. Finally, the material impact of 
my proposed doctrine would be to increase the level of compensation 
granted to powerless landowners without decreasing the compensation 
afforded to affluent landowners. Thus, progressive takings law, as I 
understand it, does not eliminate people's capacity to make moral 
choices voluntarily. Consequently, it does not reduce the moral worth 
of human action.7 9 
Having these refinements in mind, it is significant that Professor 
Lunney's developed understanding of interest group influence help-
74. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
75. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Per­
spective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FuRTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 
167, 218-19 (1983); Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of 
Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 27-32, 51-54 (Austin 
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993). 
76. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, TuE NATIJRE OFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 171 (1921): 
Every time uudges] interpret contract, property, vested rights, due process of law, liberty, 
they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy; and as such interpreta­
tion is fundamental, they give direction to all law-making. The decisions of the courts on 
economic and social questions depend upon their economic and social philosophy . . . .  
77. Dagan, supra note 71, at 1172-73; Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: 
Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
78. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167, 171 (1920). But cf Guido Calabresi, Two Functions of Formalism, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
478, 485, 488 (2000) (discussing the Italian approach to the role of law as a propounder and 
protector of ideals and implying that, as such, it is bound to fail in practice). 
79. I have discussed the relationship of law and altruism in more detail elsewhere. 
Dagan, supra note 71, at 1169-73. 
152 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:134 
fully highlights the importance of the social meaning of a progressive 
takings law. Insofar as takings law affects, to some extent, the meaning 
of ownership, it affects the normative power of various claims of own­
ers and thus their actual influence. The persuasiveness of owners' 
complaints - on the importance of which Professor Lunney rightly 
insists - is thus, to an extent, endogenous to takings law and cannot 
be regarded, as Professor Lunney regards it, as an external, pre­
existing datum that guides takings law. Therefore, by reshaping the 
meaning of ownership to include concerns for distribution and civic 
virtues, a progressive takings law reshapes our understanding of what 
constitutes the appropriate distribution of a public action's costs. This 
result, in turn, affects the normative power of interest groups' opposi­
tion in a way that reinforces the material progressive outcomes I an­
ticipated in my original article. 8 0  
V. Two EXAMPLES 
Before I conclude this Essay, I wish to turn to two examples. These 
examples help illustrate the practical differences between Professor 
Lunney's position and mine. They also demonstrate that - in contrast 
to Professor Lunney's insinuation 8 1  - my progressive takings theory, 
initially developed in the context of governmental interferences with 
land ownership, can easily be extended to other resources as well. 
These examples 8 2  further vindicate the predictability of a principled 
progressive takings law, contrary to Professor Lunney's opposite innu­
endo, 8 3  and in sharp contrast to the contemporary chaotic state of 
takings doctrine. 8 4  Finally, these examples show that Professor 
Lunney's admonitions regarding the insurmountable (Lochner-like) 
difficulties of judicial competence my theory generates are highly ex­
aggerated. 
Both examples involve cases in which the government settles a 
claim in a way that affects the rights of individual citizens. In the first 
example, the government's settlement with another sovereign limits a 
citizen's claim against that sovereign. While the Supreme Court in 
80. Jeremy Bentham has already insisted on law's limited, but significant, ability to 
"manipulate expectations" regarding property. Jeremy Waldron, Supply Without Burthen 
Revisited, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1479-80 (1997). 
81. Lunney, supra note 2, at 417 n.34. The examples Professor Lunney uses are also 
taken exclusively from the context of landownership. 
82. As well as the three examples I used in Takings and Distributive Justice, supra note 
1, at 792-801. 
83. Lunney, supra note 2, at 422. 
84. See, e.g., Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Princi­
ples, Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1301-04 
(1989). 
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Dames & Moore v. Regan85 left open as unripe the question of whether 
such a settlement constituted a taking, 8 6  Justice Powell noted in con­
currence that, "[t]he Government must pay just compensation when it 
furthers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips' 
claims lawfully held by a [sic] relatively few persons and subject to the 
jurisdiction of our courts." 87 Lower courts have followed Justice 
Powell's theory that compensatory claims with which a government 
has interfered are "property interests" for takings purposes, and have 
accordingly scrutinized the constitutionality of such governmental in­
terferences. 8 8  
The leading case in this context is Shanghai Power v. United 
States. 8 9  An American corporation sought compensation for its lost 
claim against China resulting from China's confiscation of the com­
pany's power plant in Shanghai. The President extinguished all out­
standing claims against China in the process of establishing diplomatic 
relations, and the company's portion of the settlement, about $20 mil­
lion, was far less than the company's claim of $144 million. 9 0  Judge 
Kozinski concluded that there was no compensable taking. First, al­
though the company did bear a disproportionate loss in the short term, 
there was no radical disproportionality; the company did recover some 
amount of its losses. Second, the court noted that the President's abil­
ity to establish good relations with foreign nations was what made for­
eign trade and travel for Americans and American corporations possi­
ble. 9 1  In the long-term, the company stood to benefit as a long-term 
trader, and thus no compensation was necessary notwithstanding the 
short-term disproportionate loss. 
This case vividly demonstrates the applicability of my progressive 
theory in a nonland context. The considerations raised by Judge 
Kozinski for denying compensation nicely mirror my proposed inter­
pretation of the reciprocity of advantage test: Long-term reciprocity 
suffices to deny compensation, even where the immediate burden sus­
tained by the claimant is clearly disproportionate. Moreover, because 
the company was a strong business entity able to fend for itself in ne­
gotiating with the government, this case does not present any egali­
tarian concerns that would have justified a stricter proportionality 
analysis. 
85. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
86. See id. at 688-89. 
87. Id. at 691. 
88. See, e.g. , In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th 
Cir. 1982); Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
89. 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983). 
90. Id. at 239. 
91. Id. at 244-46. 
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Furthermore, Shanghai Power is a classic example of a case in 
which Professor Lunney's "few-many test" would require compensa­
tion: Few claimants suffered substantial losses in the name of a public 
action benefiting the public as a whole. This type of case should have 
presented a conspicuous example for Professor Lunney's claim that 
compensation is needed in order to prevent concentrated interest 
groups from skewing the authorities' social calculus and blocking de­
sirable public actions. As we see, however, this warning is un­
grounded; the claimants did not block the settlement. 9 2  To be sure, as 
an effective interest group, these traders may well have succeeded in 
extracting some in-kind compensation from the pertinent governmen­
tal agency. But this, of course, only vindicates the redundancy of a le­
gal entitlement to compensation, rather than its necessity. 
Shanghai Power is a case in which Professor Lunney's few-many 
test requires compensation, whereas my progressive takings doctrine 
justifies Judge Kozinski's no-compensation ruling. My second example 
involves an inverse case, in which, according to my theory, compensa­
tion should be awarded, whereas Professor Lunney's approach would 
probably result in the denial of any compensation claim. 
Consider the recent settlement between the tobacco industry and 
the States. In another article, Professor White and I demonstrate that 
this settlement is closely analogous to the Dames & Moore pattern of 
government settlements and extinguished claims. 9 3  More precisely, we 
show that the tobacco settlement may generate statutory limitations 
on the tobacco industry's future tort liability to private litigants. 9 4  We 
also show that, even absent such direct curtailment of citizens' claims, 
there may be some indirect evidence - the States' receipt of industry 
payments in excess of their preventive and ameliorative costs and their 
spending of such funds on causes that have nothing to do with the in­
jured citizens' interests - that the tobacco settlement may sacrifice 
the interests of injured citizens. 95 
92. Professor Lunney's discussion of Penn Central may imply this response to my analy­
sis of Shanghai Power. Even if the beneficial public action was not blocked, progressive 
compensation may still have generated heightened opposition costs that are socially undesir­
able. However, as I explain above, the claim that progressive compensation generates exces­
sive opposition costs is unconvincing. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49. 
93. Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (2000). 
94. This would reintroduce the McCain Bill that would have explicitly capped injured 
smokers' compensatory claims and barred punitive damages awards and class actions. Id. at 
369-70. 
95. Id. at 371-72. To clarify: the case would have been different if the funds were held in 
trust for use by injured citizens. 
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Can injured smokers invoke the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend­
ments if these concerns tum out to be true? 9 6  Do such governmental 
interferences with citizens' compensatory claims justify compensa­
tion? 9 7  Professor Lunney's test seems to suggest a negative answer, 
since the potential claimants - the injured smokers - are many and 
dispersed. 9 8  They are of the "occasional individual" type, part of the 
nonorganized public. They have no specific political influence that 
poses a threat to beneficial public actions involving a curtailment of 
their interests. Hence, compensation is not required to buy their coop­
eration. 
Professor White and I, however, give the exact opposite answer to 
this question. In our view, governmental interference with the legal 
claims of injured citizens in the name of the public good cannot be 
deemed just unless it is accompanied by compensation. 
To see why, consider again the doctrine I advanced in Takings and 
Distributive Justice.99 It is not sufficient, under the progressive ap­
proach to takings, to show disproportionality between the benefits ac­
cruing to the injured smokers through the tobacco settlement and the 
harm they suffer insofar as the settlement interferes with their com­
pensatory claims against the industry. The key lies again in the re­
quirement of long-term reciprocity. This requirement insists that 
probable, and not merely theoretical, reciprocity take place. The mere 
fact of the owner's membership in the benefited community cannot be 
of enough advantage to offset a tangible disproportionate loss. Long­
term reciprocity further safeguards against too extreme a transient 
imbalance by disallowing overly excessive private burdens. In the case 
of the tobacco settlement, this requirement patently fails to obtain. It 
is hard to see what future probable benefits could offset the very sig­
nificant harm (diminution of value) of injured smokers once the gov­
ernment interferes with their compensatory claims against the tobacco 
industry. Absent a Shanghai Power-like finding of long-term reciproc­
ity, compensation should be - according to my proposed doctrine -
required. 
96. Class actions advancing such claims have been recently filed. See Stephen Labaton, 
Medicaid Smokers Seek to Gain Share of States ' Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, January 26, 2000, at 
11. 
97. Governmental interferences with citizens' punitive damages awards present complex 
questions that cannot be addressed here. See Dagan & White, supra note 93, at 416-24. 
98. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Tak­
ings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 433, 440-41 (1995) ("courts should focus on 
whether government has: (i) changed or restricted property rights that are (ii) of significant 
value only to a very few to benefit the very many . . . .  If such singling out has not occurred, 
then a court should allow the government to impose the rights change without compensating 
the adversely affected property holders" (emphasis added)); see also id. at 497-98 (same). 
99. Other approaches to takings also reach similar conclusions. Dagan & White, supra 
note 93, at 415. 
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The egalitarian concerns of my progressive takings doctrine further 
bolster this conclusion. In order to see why, we do not need to second 
guess the socially optimal decision or to separate legitimate from ille­
gitimate political power, as Professor Lunney's Lochner-ism line of 
critique maintains. Rather, it is enough for us to evaluate the political 
power of the claimants, an evaluation which is surprisingly similar to 
the questions Professor Lunney's theory asks us to address. 
Whereas the inquiry my theory requires is analogous to the inquiry 
needed under Professor Lunney's theory, our conclusions are strik­
ingly contradictory. In my view, the fact that the (many and dispersed) 
injured smokers are devoid of any political clout supports - rather 
than undermines - the urgency of compensation. Without a strong 
constitutional guarantee, the interests of injured citizens may easily be 
disregarded, and public officials may use their compensatory damages 
for more politically-visible purposes. Neither distributive justice nor 
efficiency is promoted by inducing these perverse incentives. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Lunney helpfully advances the public choice analysis of 
takings law by insisting that the social persuasiveness of interest 
groups' claims, and not only their wealth, power, and collective action 
comparative advantage, determines their impact on public decisions. 
This insight highlights the significance of the social meaning of the 
constitutional right to property, which is, in turn, affected by the way 
society shapes takings law. Hence, this refined public choice analysis 
requires us to interject the evaluation of these cultural consequences 
of takings law into the more directly material consequences of our 
doctrinal alternatives. 
Taking these implications seriously bolsters, rather than frustrates, 
the progressive approach to takings. Professor Lunney's response em­
phasizes the significance of my proposal to graft social responsibility 
and equality onto takings law. It also reinforces, rather than under­
mines, my argument that takings doctrine must supply an effective 
counterbalance to the "natural" power disparity in society in order to 
ensure unbiased governmental decisions. 
